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11 Introduction
Many social scientists would agree that economic growth and welfare are
highly inﬂuenced by cultural and social factors. Such intuition remains
though in most cases rather vague, due to the fact that cultures and so-
cial systems are polyhedral entities, diﬃcult to capture with formal models.
We provide a formal representation of the dynamics of a particular aspect of
such processes: how growth and well-being may be inﬂuenced by a shift in
the allocation of time between social and private activities.
It is intuitively clear, and well acknowledged by social psychologists [see
e.g. Moscovici (1993)], that individual well-being depends crucially on social
relations. In contrast, most economic models let it depend just on private
consumption1 [see Cole, Mailath, Postlewaite (1992) for a discussion of why
this is the case and Gui (2000) for an investigation of the interpersonal di-
mension of economic interaction]. Cultures and societies diﬀer in the relative
weight they attribute to these two sources of well-being. Single individuals
face a choice between them as well, in that they may choose either to invest
more time in social activities or to substitute them with private ones, which
are less exposed to the inﬂuence of others’ behavior. This choice is highly
conditioned, among other factors, by the quality of the social environment
surrounding an individual: a poor social environment lowers the opportuni-
ties available to the time spent in social activities, and may render it more a
source of frustration than of satisfaction. As a consequence, individuals may
be led to defend themselves from social poverty by concentrating more on
private activities, but if such behavior spreads over, it will further worsen the
quality of social environment. The ﬁnal eﬀect may be an individualization
of the basic sources of well-being, which fosters private activities (e.g. con-
sumption and production of private goods) and hence stimulates economic
growth, but at the expense of negative social externalities which accumulate
their eﬀects over time.
This extreme polarization needs not necessarily be the case, and one
can imagine more balanced development paths, but the mechanism outlined
seems indeed relevant and worth of investigation. In particular, a trend
towards individualization is probably observable in many diﬀerent countries
(the extent to which this is true is an empirical question). Moreover, the
possibility for economic growth to be accompanied by social poverty, and
1For this reason we prefer to use the term well-being in spite of welfare.
2the fact that it does not automatically bring about social development, is an
old but still actual idea in many social sciences. We investigate it here with
the tools of modern economics. Since ours is a theoretical enquiry, we do not
want to insist on the empirical aspects of such phenomena, which are indeed
more complicated than we are sketching them here, but we would rather
like to make two general points: ﬁrst, the substitution of social with private
activities may constitute an engine of market-based growth and the lack of
this substitution may represent an obstacle to growth; second, if we consider
social relations relevant for individual well-being, there is the possibility for
private growth not to be well-being improving. To capture these eﬀects, we
propose an evolutionary model of growth, which focuses on defensive choices
and merges a game theoretic analysis [see Weibull (1995)] of the evolution of
social participation with a model of dynamic accumulation of its eﬀects on
social environment.
In Section 2 we discuss how these cumulative eﬀects on social environment
may be thought of in terms of social capital and how they relate to social
participation dynamics on one side and to the theory of endogenous growth
on the other. In Section 3 we further investigate the process of substitution
of social activities with private activities. Sections 4, 5 and 6 display the
model. Section 7 discusses its outcomes in terms of well-being and growth.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Social participation and social capital ac-
cumulation
Let us start to deﬁne what we mean by private and social activities. We call
private those activities that either can be carried on by an individual alone
or that are instrumental to them. In particular, we focus on consumption
and production of private goods2. Unlike private activities, social activities
cannot be carried on by an individual in isolation: if they are not shared,
2Consumption of public goods is a private activity as well, but, since the distinction
between private and public goods is not relevant in the present context, we shall ignore it
and speak henceforth just of private goods. Moreover, it is admittedly a simpliﬁcation to
consider the time spent in production just as a private activity, but it captures indeed a
relevant aspect of labor, namely the fact that, in order to consume, one has to work. In
the concluding section we discuss the consequences of considering the social dimension of
production activities.
3they simply do not exist. For this reason, their success or failure, and hence
the utility they provide to the individuals involved, depend at least on four
distinctive factors: ﬁrst, the level of participation of other individuals (in
general, the more the participants, and the more the time they spend on
a social activity, the higher the utility of each one of them3); second, an
individual’s own participation (most social activities, even in the case in
which they have positive external eﬀects, provide though higher beneﬁts to
the participants than to the non-participants; moreover, they are mostly
time intensive); third, the speciﬁc identity of the participants; ﬁnally, the
opportunities available in a certain social environment.
No widespread agreement has yet been reached about how to model these
eﬀects. A relevant contribution, quite close in the spirit to our stress on so-
cial activities, is Uhlaner (1989), who introduces in economic literature the
notion of ’relational goods’. She argues that traditional rational choice mod-
els cannot explain why people are willing to undertake costly actions such
as political participation and voting, despite their awareness that the actual
inﬂuence of their participation or of their vote is indeed negligible in terms
of the ﬁnal outcome; on the contrary, such behaviors can be understood as
rational once we consider that people are enjoying a ’relational good’. Rela-
tional goods are deﬁned as a particular type of local public goods, that can
only be produced and consumed through the joint action of several individu-
als, whose identities become relevant. Corneo, Jeanne (1999a) refer to them
as ’socially provided private goods’, but the essence does not change. Ex-
amples of relational goods are social approval, solidarity, friendship, sharing
life with another person, creating or reinforcing group identity or the sense
of aﬃliation to a group (possibly cultivated through the identiﬁcation with
shared social or ethical norms). It is evident that such factors play a ma-
jor role in shaping individual identity. Akerlof, Kranton (2000) argue very
convincingly that identity explains a great variety of economic choices, but
they provide no explicit analysis of the social process through which identity
is shaped. Even if our focus is not directly on identity, we investigate some
channels of social interaction that contribute to determine individual identity
indirectly through the shaping of social environment4
3In some cases, even congestion increases utility. A convincing example is provided
by Uhlaner’s (1989) observation that ”a baseball game is more exciting when the park is
full”.
4One economically relevant dimension of a person’s social identity is, for instance, social
status, on whose relevance we return in Section 3.
4Since social interaction provides direct utility to the participants, fol-
lowing Uhlaner (1989) we call ’relational goods’ (Bi) what an individual (i)
enjoys when participating to some social activity. Relational goods depend
on the following factors: Bi = B(ri,r−i,I,Ks), where ri is individual i’s own
participation, r−i is the others’ participation, I is a vector of social identities
of the participants, and Ks measures the ’quality’ of the social environment,
which is inherited from past history. In Section 4, when presenting the formal
model, we choose a particular speciﬁcation of this function, which reduces to
Bi = siR(Ks,x), where si is individual i’s investment of time in social activ-
ities and R(Ks,x) represents the amount of social opportunities available (x
captures the overall participation, Ks the accumulated eﬀects of past inter-
action and, for simplicity, in the present study we ignore any identity-related
issue5).
Coming to the factor Ks, we interpret it as social capital. There is by
now a huge literature on social capital, following in particular Coleman (1988,
1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995) [see World Bank’s (2001) electronic library
on social capital]. The term social capital has been used by diﬀerent authors
with slightly diﬀerent meanings [see in particular Grootaert (1998) and for
a reconstruction and Bowles, Gintis (2000) for a criticism]. Coleman (1988,
1990) deﬁnes it as a set of long-lasting patterns of social relationships, which
constitute a resource that actors can use to realize their interests [see also
Granovetter (1973)]. These attributes of the social structure are referred
to as a form of capital since they have the nature of a stock that is fed or
depleted through time as relations evolve, and this stock may be seen as
an input in an individual production function. Coleman also provides an
articulated taxonomy of the diﬀerent forms of social capital. Collier (1998)
summarizes the concept of social capital as those ’externality generating so-
cial interactions’ which either are themselves durable or whose eﬀects are
durable, and classiﬁes the diﬀerent possible external eﬀects. Narayan (1999)
acknowledges that, at the highest level of generality, the term social capital
refers to ’the glue that holds groups and societies together - bonds of shared
5As it will be clear in Section 4, this expression for Bi is derived as follows: with
a continuous population of measure 1, we allow individuals to choose between spending
more or less time in social activities (respectively, sH and sL); hence, we identify ri = si,
si ∈ {sL,sH}, and, called x the fraction of the population that chooses sH, we let r−i =
[sHx + sL(1 − x)]; further, we assume that social opportunities available take the form
R(Ks,x) = [sHx + sL(1 − x)]βKγ
s and, after dropping I since we presently ignore the
eﬀects of identity, we obtain Bi = siR(Ks,x).
5values, norms and institutions’. More speciﬁcally, he provides the following
deﬁnition: ”Social capital is deﬁned as the norms and social relations em-
bedded in the social structures of societies that enable people to coordinate
action to achieve desired goals”. After discussing some related concepts, he
focuses attention on the fact that the same ties that link some individual
may result in social exclusion of those outside a speciﬁc group (or relational
network), and discusses how social ’cross-cutting ties’ may be complement or
substitute for the well functioning of the state. The empirical relevance of so-
cial capital for growth is pointed out, among the others, by Temple, Johnson
(1998), who show that a measure of ’social capability’ is a good predictor for
long run growth, and by Knack, Keefer (1997), who ﬁnd that one standard
deviation change in a measure of trust is associated with a change in growth
of more than half a standard deviation.
From this literature it emerges that there are at least two useful ways
of thinking of social capital: one is in terms of evolution of customs and
social norms, the other is in terms of the formation of associations and other
social organizations. Sometimes the former is used as a deﬁnition of social
capital and the latter as a proxy for it [see Putnam (1993), who views it as
constituted by ’networks of civic engagement’ and associated norms which
facilitate coordination and cooperation and proposes the density of volun-
tary organizations as a proxy; in a similar vein see also Paldam, Svendsen
(2000), whose deﬁnition focuses though on trust, as Fukuyama’s (1995) one].
In any case, these are just two aspects of the same dynamic process of social
interaction. Moreover, accumulation of any form of social capital requires
investment in relations [see the experimental and survey study of Glaeser
et al. (1999)]. Hence, we do not distinguish any further among the pos-
sible forms of social capital, but rather try to capture the dynamics of its
accumulation at an aggregate level as a result of the evolution of social par-
ticipation. For simplicity, we focus on a homogeneous population, so that we
ignore here the problems of social stratiﬁcation and social exclusion inves-
tigated by Narayan. We assume that social capital is accumulated when a
higher aggregate social participation renders more social opportunities avail-
able and strengthens social relations, shared norms and the level of trust.
Investment in social capital takes here the primary form of time investment
in social activities6 and its costs can be measured in terms of forgone private
6Notice that the same activity, i.e. social participation, gives rise both to consumption
of relational goods and to accumulation of social capital. The fact that consumption and
6consumption7.
Since social capital has mainly the nature of a public good, a general
problem of under-investment could be relevant. This point was already made
by Coleman, but his emphasis was on the forgone positive externalities of
social capital for private growth (in particular, through its contribution to
the creation of human capital). In contrast, we look at under-investment in
social capital from a diﬀerent point of view: social poverty could generate
higher instead of lower private growth, because agents are led to defend
themselves from it through the substitution of social activities with private
ones [see Antoci and Bartolini (1999) for an analysis of negative externalities
and growth]8. Nevertheless, we show formally that, under certain plausible
conditions, growth and well-being may evolve in opposite directions. To our
knowledge, these aspects have not yet been considered in the literature on
social capital, at least not within the framework of a formal model. Moreover,
while Coleman and others interpret social capital as an input in an individual
production function, we rather focus on its relevance from an aggregate and
dynamic point of view, that is to say, we are more interested in its importance
in the process through which an economy as a whole (or a part of it) is able to
reproduce its relational patterns, to modify its aggregate performance, and
to alter the roots of people’s well-being9.
A similar observation applies to the relationship between our model and
those of endogenous growth [see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Aghion
and Howitt (1998)]. The theory of endogenous growth has deeply investigated
the role of the accumulation of factors diﬀerent from physical capital for
investment are not opposed here should not surprise, since it is a common feature of the
forms of non material capital (e.g., the use of knowledge increases its stock, rather than
diminishing it). Such intuition goes back to the Aristotelian analysis of ethical virtues,
whose seeds are still to be found in Nussbaum’s (1986) investigation of relational goods.
7It will be interesting, in a future study, to consider the fact that social organizations
require some form of physical capital as well, and hence individuals have to provide a
material contribution to be able to enjoy the beneﬁts from them.
8Notice that this assumption strengthens our results. In the concluding section we
discuss the consequences of allowing an impoverishment in social capital to be harmful for
growth.
9The idea that capital is not just a productive input, but rather the process of repro-
duction of certain economic relations, has been most famously stated by Marx, but it is
not strictly dependent upon his entire theoretical system, and can be applied in evolution-
ary contexts in general [see also Paldam, Svendsen (2000) for a distinction of approaches
based on production, transaction costs and monitoring costs].
7an economy’s growth, but its main focus has been on the accumulation of
human capital. Though, it is interesting to notice that Lucas (1988) already
distinguished between internal and external eﬀects of human capital, the
former basically constituted by the increased productivity due to privately
acquired knowledge, while the latter taking place to a relevant degree through
the relations among economic actors10. While we extend the idea of such
external eﬀects by modelling their dynamics, the main diﬀerence remains
that we are not adding a new input in a production function, but rather
focusing on how social dynamics may aﬀect growth and well-being in the
medium-long run, possibly, as anticipated, in opposite directions11.
Two remarks are in order. First, we admit that theoretically social capital
accumulation, and enjoyment of relational goods as well, might also take
place through market interactions; but the overall impact on them of an
expansion of the market may still be negative, in that the latter is private-
oriented and does not foster a collective orientation [see Polanyi (1977) for
an analysis of the market as a form of integration of economic activities;
more recently Anderson (1990) for a discussion of its ethical limitations;
Sacco, Zamagni (1997) for an inquiry into civil economy and the role of
reciprocity; Elster (1989) for an investigation of the problems generated by
10In his words: ”We know from ordinary experience that there are group interactions
that are central to individual productivity [...] Certainly in our own profession, the beneﬁts
of colleagues from whom we hope to learn are tangible enough to lead us to spend a
considerable fraction of our time ﬁghting over who they shall be, and another fraction
travelling to talk with those we wish we could have as colleagues but cannot”.
11It may be still important to stress the diﬀerence between social capital and the concepts
of human capital and of technology, which constitute the main sources of growth in the
endogenous growth models. Romer (1989) presents such models as assuming ”the existence
of an aggregate production function F(·) that depends on a subset of the following list of
inputs: services from physical capital K, labor services L from a person with a minimal
level of schooling and training, services from additional human capital H, and measure of
the technology or state of the art A”. He adds that ”A is like a public good”, in that
it represents public knowledge available at zero marginal cost, which is accumulated as
a side eﬀect of the investments in physical capital. Social capital is similar to the latter
variable, in that it shares with it the nature of public good (at least locally, i.e. for those
who belong to a certain relational network), but it diﬀers from it because it is the result of
a speciﬁc investment of time (and possibly of other resources) in building and maintaining
relations, while the variable A is generally seen as a side eﬀect of the production activity.
Moreover, social capital diﬀers essentially from H not only in that its services are largely
not privately appropriable, but also because it cannot even be built and accumulated by
a single individual, since it is rather the result of some form of reciprocal or collective
action.
8collective action]. Second, we neglect here the role of investments in physical
and human capital just for the sake of simplicity. Nevertheless, we believe
that our results may be generalized to an economy with physical and human
capital accumulation and this task is in our future agenda.
3 Substitution of social activities with pri-
vate activities
We have already pointed out that the process of substitution of social activ-
ities with private ones, which constitutes the key mechanism of our model,
may emerge as agents try to defend themselves from a poor social environ-
ment. Hirsch (1976) argues that this substitution may be due to another
reason as well. In aﬄuent societies, as the quantity of consumption goods
increases, the time needed to consume them becomes both more scarce and
more expensive. This eﬀect is strengthened by positional competition, that
forces each individuals to earn an increasing income if they want to keep
their relative social position12. These two processes generate an increasing
pressure on time, which leads to a substitution of time-saving (e.g. fast-
foods) for time-intensive consumption (e.g. relational goods emerging from
participation to social activities) [see the pioneering contribution of Becker
(1965)]. In Hirsch’s own words:
As the subjective cost of time rises, pressure for speciﬁc balancing of
personal advantage in social relationships will increase. [...] Percep-
tion of the time spent in social relationships as a cost is itself a product
of privatized aﬄuence. The eﬀect is to whittle down the amount of
friendship and social contact [...]. The huge increase in personal mo-
bility in modern economies adds to the problem by making sociability
more of a public and less of a private good. The more people move,
the lower are the chances of social contacts being reciprocated directly
on a bilateral basis. (p.80)
The relevance of the last point, i.e. of personal mobility, for the substitution
of social by private activities, is also investigated by Schiﬀ (1992) [see also
12There is by now a large literature on the economics of status seeking and on concerns
for relative position in income or in consumption. Reviewing it is though beyond the scope
of this paper.
9Schiﬀ (1999) for a general equilibrium model of labor mobility in the pres-
ence of social capital]. He starts from the consideration of the following two
striking aspects of U.S. society: ”the higher level of wealth for a huge number
of people, on one hand, and a weaker social support structure, on the other
(including a higher crime rate, weaker interpersonal relations, and more iso-
lation)”. He next sheds light on the substitution process we are interested in
by observing that
The need to cope with the high degree of isolation caused by the
higher degree of geographic labor mobility may lead to the creation of
alternative institutions where people who are not as close can interact
(e.g., singles’ bars, dating services, nursing homes, insurance, and so
on). These market activities enter into the gross national product
(GNP) but do not necessarily imply higher welfare than in societies
where some of these functions are carried out outside the market.
(p.167-168)
Taken together, these observations show that, out of many diﬀerent possible
causes, the substitution process on which we are focusing is a relevant one. Its
eﬀects on growth and poverty are worth of formal analysis: in contrast with
much of the literature on social capital, but together with Schiﬀ, we stress
that the decline in social capital brought about by this substitution could be
accompanied by (or could be itself an engine of) private growth, registered
in national accounting13; on the other side, the overall eﬀect in terms of well-
being may be negative (so that we can speak of social poverty traps). This is
due to diﬀerent causes. First of all, an individual’s shift of time from social
to private activities imposes a negative externality on the others, in terms of
decreased opportunities of social interaction [see Collier (1998)]. Secondly, as
we argued above, these externalities accumulate over time. Third, since we do
not take as granted that agents are perfect optimizers, but we rather represent
them as boundedly rational and their behaviors as involved in an evolutionary
social selection dynamics, this social selection dynamics may act as a form of
external pressure (possibly the same pointed out by Hirsch14), which leads
13Notice however that in developing countries, where welfare still depends to a sub-
stantial degree upon the satisfaction of primary needs, the converse problem may arise,
since a highly relational-oriented culture might become an objective obstacle for a strong
market-based growth, as people are relatively unwilling to give up part of the time spent
in social activities to embrace income-generating ones.
14Hirsch has stressed in particular the unavoidable aggregate dissatisfaction generated
by positional competition, which is indeed a rat race (even if it may have indirect positive
10individuals to adopt strategies that are presently or dynamically sub-optimal.
All these eﬀects are explicitly formalized in the next sections. In particular,
the latter one opens the way to an analysis of diﬀerent possible causes of
social poverty traps in connection with the question of the optimality of
individual strategies, an analysis that will be carried on in Section 7.
4 The model
We model an economy in which agents choose how to allocate their time be-
tween private and social activities. Participating to the latter ones requires
time and forgoing some private consumption, but they provide an individual
utility which depends both on her own and on aggregate participation, as
well as on the opportunities available in the social environment. Agents may
defend themselves from a poor social environment by shifting to private ac-
tivities, less exposed to external eﬀects. If this strategy spreads over, private
activities will be fostered, but at the expense of social activities.
In particular, we assume a (homogeneous) continuous population of mea-
sure 1, whose well-being depends on three kinds of goods15: a private sub-
sistence good (Y ), a relational good (B) and a private good which is perfect
substitute of the relational good (Ys)16. In every instant (say, every day, but
we adopt a continuous speciﬁcation), each individual has to choose how to
allocate her time endowment (normalized to 1) between social and private
activities (respectively, s and l = 1 − s). For simplicity, we assume that
agents have to choose between the two following pure strategies:
(R) a relational-oriented strategy, corresponding to the couple {sH,lL}, where
lL = 1 − sH;
(P) a private-oriented strategy, corresponding to the couple {sL,lH}, where
lH = 1 − sL and 0 < sL < sH < 1 (so that 0 < lL < lH < 1).
Notice that, for shortness, we can summarize strategies R and P as the
choice of respectively sH and sL.
welfare eﬀects through the fostering of private growth [see Corneo, Jeanne(1999a, 1999b)]).
15In what follows we shall assume for simplicity that there are just three single goods,
but it would be easy to generalize to the case of three bundles of goods.
16The assumption that Ys is a perfect substitute for the relational good is obviously
rather optimistic [see Anderson (1990)]. By such assumption, the results about well-being
in the next section gain more relevance.
11Private activities amount to the production and consumption of private
goods, according to the following technology: under the relational strategy,
the amount of time lL serves to produce and consume a ﬁxed quantity ¯ Y of
private subsistence goods; under the private strategy, agents still use lL to
produce and consume ¯ Y , but with the additional time (lH −lL) they produce
and consume also an amount ¯ Ys of the private goods which are substitutes
of relational goods.
Social activities provide utility through the enjoyment of relational goods.
As pointed out in Section 2, relational goods enjoyed by individual i are
speciﬁed as follows (notice that we can identify an individual with her chosen
strategy, so that i ∈ {R,P}):
Bi(Ks,x) = siR(Ks,x), (1)
where si is individual i’s investment of time in social activities (i.e. either
sL or sH) and R(Ks,x) represents the amount of social opportunities avail-
able. The latter ones depend in turn on the level Ks of social capital and
on the total amount of time devoted to social activities by the population
[sHx + sL(1 − x)], where x ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of individuals choosing
the relational strategy. Notice that Ks captures the accumulated eﬀect of
past social participation, whereas x measures its present level17. R(Ks,x) is
speciﬁed as follows:




where β and γ are strictly positive parameters18. Notice that R(Ks,x) is
an increasing function of x. Notice as well that in our model the time not
spent in production and consumption of private goods is not itself a ﬁnal
good, but rather an intermediate good, whose value in terms of enjoyed rela-
tional goods depends on the social participation of the rest of the population
and on the amount of social opportunities available.
We can now write down the full expression of the payoﬀs of the two
strategies. Following the relational strategy yields
17Let us emphasize that x = 1 does not mean that individuals spend all of their time in
social activities, but rather that all of them spend relatively more time in these activities
and relatively less in private ones.
18Since our results do not depend on β, we could, without loss of generality, set it equal
to 1.
12UR(Ks,x) ≡ ln ¯ Y + ln[BR(Ks,x)] = (3)
= ln ¯ Y + ln[sHR(Ks,x)] =




The private strategy yields
UP(Ks,x) ≡ ln ¯ Y + ln[BP(Ks,x) + a¯ Ys] = (4)
= ln ¯ Y + ln[sLR(Ks,x) + a¯ Ys] =
= ln ¯ Y + ln{sL[sHx + sL(1 − x)]
βK
γ
s + a¯ Ys},
where a is a strictly positive parameter which represents the marginal
rate of substitution between BP(Ks,x) and ¯ Ys.
Notice that an increase of the proportion of individuals choosing strategy
P (i.e. an increase of 1 − x) generates a negative externality which aﬀects
especially individuals that do not consume ¯ Ys. Hence, by following strategy
P, individuals have the opportunity to defend themselves from this negative
externality.
5 Evolution of social participation
We follow an evolutionary game approach and assume that the time deriva-
tive of x, ˙ x ≡ dx
dt, is given by the so called ’replicator equation’ [see Weibull
(1995)]:
˙ x = x[UR(Ks,x) − ¯ U(Ks,x)], (5)
where ¯ U(Ks,x) is the average payoﬀ
¯ U(Ks,x) ≡ UR(Ks,x)x + UP(Ks,x)(1 − x). (6)
The choice of the replicator dynamics as social selection mechanism does
not imply a real loss of generality in a two-strategy setting like the one of
the present paper (although the dynamic interaction with the accumulation
social capital, discussed in the Section 6 below could, at least in principle).
It must be pointed out, however, that the choice of the replicator equation as
13a ’representative’ form of selection dynamics is not arbitrary. As pointed out
e.g. by Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull (1996), every payoﬀ-monotonic selection
dynamics can be represented in terms of the replicator dynamics (by means
of a suitable time and/or strategy dependent factor) and, moreover, such
dynamics is consistent with several realistic individual and social learning
mechanisms, such as simple forms of reinforcement of successful own behav-
iors or imitation of observed successful behaviors of others [see also B¨ orgers,
Sarin (1997) and Schlag (1998) for deeper insights into the behavioral micro-
foundations of the replicator dynamics].
Equation (??) may be rewritten as follows:
˙ x = x(1 − x)∆U(Ks,x), (7)
where ∆U(Ks,x) is the payoﬀ diﬀerential
∆U(Ks,x) ≡ UR(Ks,x) − UP(Ks,x) = (8)
= ln
sH[sL + (sH − sL)x]βKγ
s
sL[sL + (sH − sL)x]βK
γ
s + a¯ Ys
.
In general the evolution of social participation will depend on the dy-
namics of Ks, but for expositional purposes it is worthwhile to start with
a separate analysis of ˙ x when the stock of social capital is ﬁxed. Through-
out the rest of this section we treat consequently Ks as a strictly positive
parameter.
The following proposition gives a classiﬁcation of dynamics (??) when Ks
is constant.













then, for every initial value x(0) (6= 1), the adoption process converges




















s < Ks < K
2
s, (11)
then both the ﬁxed points x = 0 and x = 1 are locally attracting and
their attraction basins are separated by the repulsive ﬁxed point ¯ x ∈















Proof Notice ﬁrst that ˙ x = 0 ⇐⇒ {x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ ∆U(x) = 0}.
Since
d∆U(x)
dx > 0 ∀x ∈ (0,1), this implies that x = 0 and x = 1 are the only
possible attracting ﬁxed points.
Finally, from the observation that ∆U(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = ¯ x [see equation (??)]
and that sgn(˙ x) = sgn[∆U(x)] it immediately follows that
¯ x ≥ 1 [i.e. ∆U(x) < 0 ∀x ∈ (0,1)] ⇐⇒ (??);
¯ x ≤ 0 [i.e. ∆U(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ (0,1)] ⇐⇒ (??);
¯ x ∈ (0,1) (i.e. ∃ interior repulsive ﬁxed point) ⇐⇒ (??). Q.E.D.
Notice that, by (??), the attraction basin of x = 1 expands if the value
of Ks increases.
The next proposition concerns the value of ¯ U(x) in the ﬁxed points.
Proposition 2 The ﬁxed point x = 1 Pareto-dominates the ﬁxed point x = 0

















15When the interior ﬁxed point ¯ x exists [see case (iii) of Proposition 1],
then it holds
¯ U(1) > ¯ U(¯ x) > ¯ U(0).
insert ﬁgures 1a-1c about here
Proof Notice that in x = 0, in x = 1 and in x = ¯ x each individual has
the same utility level ¯ U(x), [deﬁned in (??)], respectively equal to UP(0),
UR(1), and both UR(¯ x) and UP(¯ x). Now, (??) just amounts to a re-writing
of UR(1) > UP(0). Recalling that UR(x), UP(x) and ¯ U(x) are all strictly
increasing in x, the last result follows immediately. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 implies that if the ﬁxed point x = 1 is locally attractive
[cases (ii)-(iii)] it always Pareto-dominates the ﬁxed point x = 0, even when
the latter is locally attractive. Furthermore, even if x = 0 is the unique
attracting ﬁxed point [case (i)], it may be Pareto-dominated by x = 1; in
particular, this is the case when K3
s < Ks ≤ K1
s.
If case (i) holds or if the initial distribution x of strategies belongs to the
interval [0, ¯ x) in case (iii), then x converges to 0. Along the trajectory that
drives the economy to x = 0, an increasing proportion of individuals build
their well-being on private rather than on social sources. Consequently, the
aggregate production and consumption of private goods increases and the
population experiences economic growth. Proposition 2 says that economic
growth may be well-being worsening. In such case, economic growth is the
undesirable eﬀect of a coordination failure.
6 Evolution of social capital
In the above section, social capital Ks has been taken as a parameter; we have
seen that such parameter plays a key role in determining the relative perfor-
mance of pure strategies R and P and the well-being properties of attracting
ﬁxed points under dynamics (??). However, the assumption of stationarity
of Ks is restrictive; therefore, in this section we augment dynamics (??) by
an equation describing the evolution of social capital. More speciﬁcally, we
assume that the accumulation of Ks builds on a learning-by-doing mechanism
as follows:
16˙ Ks = BR(Ks,x)x + BP(Ks,x)(1 − x) − δKs = (14)
= [sHx + sL(1 − x)]R(Ks,x) − δKs,
where δ > 0 is the depreciation rate of Ks.
Equation (??) assumes that social capital increases when available social
opportunities are eﬀectively exploited, i.e. individuals devote time to social
activities and enjoy relational goods. We are closer here to an interpretation
of social capital in terms of evolution of customs and of social norms rather
then in terms of construction of associations and other social organization;
however, as discussed in Section 2, these are just two aspects of a same
process, so that our assumption does not appear to be very restrictive.
By plugging in (??) the expression given in (??) for R(Ks,x), we can
write (??) as follows:
˙ Ks = Ks{[sL + (sH − sL)x]
1+βK
γ−1
s − δ}. (15)
We shall analyze dynamics (??), (??) in the region of the plane (Ks,x) in
which Ks ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. We work out the complete classiﬁcation of the
dynamics in the appendix. Figures 2, 3 and 4 (corresponding respectively to
γ > 1, γ = 1 and γ < 1) illustrate the diﬀerent possible cases19. The next
proposition summarizes the main results.
Insert ﬁgures 2 to 4 about here
Proposition 3 There are two possible asymptotic attractors, (KL
s ,0) and
(KH
s ,1), where KL
s and KH





0 , if γ ≥ 1





∞ , if γ ≥ 1
ˆ Ks(1) , if γ < 1
(16)
Both attractors are present in ﬁgures 2, 3.b and 4.c.
Only (KH
s ,1) is present in ﬁgures 3.a and 4.a.
Only (KL
s ,0) is present in ﬁgures 3.c and 4.c.
Along the trajectory leading to (KL
s ,0), the economy experiences private
growth at the expenses of social participation and ends up in a state of social
19In the ﬁgures, sinks are represented by full dots •, sources by open dots ◦ and saddle
points by drawing their stable and unstable manifolds.
17poverty; along the path towards (KH
s ,1), expansion of social participation
leads to social prosperity, but at the expenses of private growth.
Proof See appendix.
7 Well-being and social poverty traps
We next consider the well-being properties of the two asymptotic attractors
(KL
s ,0) and (KH
s ,1) and of the other ﬁxed points of dynamics (??), (??).
Proposition 4 When both attractors are present, (KH




s ,1) Pareto-dominates every other ﬁxed point of
the dynamics.
When only (KL
s ,0) is present, for γ = 1 it Pareto-dominates the only
other ﬁxed (0,1); for γ < 1 (KL
s ,0) may be Pareto-dominated by some other
ﬁxed point: in particular, ˆ Ks(1) > K3
s is a suﬃcient condition for (KL
s ,0) to
be Pareto-dominated by (KL
s ,0) and ( ˆ Ks(1),1).
Proof We work out the proof only for the ﬁrst sentence of Proposition 4.
Since the proof of the other results works exactly the same way, we omit
it. Recall from Proposition 2 that, given Ks, ¯ U(Ks,1) > ¯ U(Ks,0) ⇐⇒
Ks > K3
s. Notice then that, given x, ¯ U(Ks,x) is a strictly increasing func-
tion of Ks. When both attractors are present, for γ ≥ 1 (case (a) and
subcase (b.2)), (Ks,x) → (∞,1) for t → ∞ (see ﬁgures 2.a-2.c and 3.b)
and along this trajectory the value of ¯ U(Ks,x) becomes deﬁnitely higher
than in any ﬁxed point of the dynamics; for γ < 1 (subcase (c.2), see ﬁg-
ure 4.b), it is enough to notice that K3
s < K1
s = ˜ Ks(1) < ˆ Ks(1), so that
¯ U( ˆ Ks(1),1) > ¯ U( ˆ Ks(1),0) > ¯ U( ˆ Ks(0),0). Q.E.D.
As already mentioned, in (KL
s ,0) the economy reaches the highest level
of expansion of private wealth at the expenses of social participation. Along
the trajectories leading the economy to such traps we observe an economic
growth process driven by the destruction of social opportunities and by their
substitution by private goods.
The above considerations do not however imply that it is always ’optimal’
for individuals to manage to coordinate their choices on the strategy R. The
problem is analogous to that of the interpretation of the well known Golden
18Rule in Solow’s model as a normative device. To consider it, we have to
study how individual behavior could rationally deviate from the dynamics
assumed in the replicator equation (??). To this purpose, we ﬁrst give the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 We shall say that the state (KH
s ,1) is achievable from a given
initial value K0




Deﬁnition 1 says that a state is achievable when the dynamics of Ks brings
to it in presence of the highest possible social participation (x = 1), i.e., when
individuals, by coordinating on strategy R, would be able to reach it. The
next proposition sheds light on the ’optimality’ of coordinating on strategy





s ,1) is achievable from K0
s, coordinating on strategy
R is individually ’optimal’ both in transition and in (KH
s ,1). Therefore,





s ,1) is achievable from K0
s, coordinating on strategy
R is individually ’optimal’ only if agents are patient enough (or altruist
toward future generations), and social poverty traps may be interpreted
as the combined result of a coordination failure and of impatience (or
of lack of altruism toward future generations).
(iii) If (KH
s ,1) is not achievable from K0
s, social poverty traps are the result
of the technology of social capital accumulation.
Proof Notice ﬁrst that, if γ < 1, (KH
s ,1) is achievable whatever is K0
s > 0
(see ﬁgures 4.a-4.c); if γ > 1, (KH
s ,1) is achievable only if K0
s > ˆ Ks(1) (see
ﬁgures 2.a-2.c) and, if γ = 1, (KH
s ,1) is achievable only if x∗ > 1 [see (??)]
and K0
s > 0 (see ﬁgures 3.a-3.c). If (KH
s ,1) is not achievable from a given
initial value K0
s, then any trajectory passing through a point with Ks = K0
s
does not converge to (KH
s ,1) whatever individuals’ choices of strategy may
be.
The results in cases (i) and (ii) of Proposition 5 follow from Proposition 2.
Speciﬁcally, by simultaneously choosing strategy R, in case (i) agents could
19obtain in every instant of time a payoﬀ higher than they get if they behave
according to the replicator dynamics; in case (ii), on the contrary, they would
have to face an initial reduction of their payoﬀ. Therefore, in case (ii) the
convenience to coordinate on strategy R is associated to their discount factor
as in Solow’s model. Finally, case (iii) is self-evident. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 opens the way to some policy considerations. The ﬁrst
point to be made is that social arrangements matter for growth and well-
being in a non-obvious way. The mentioned literature on social capital has
already pointed out, theoretically and empirically, that an impoverishment in
social capital is detrimental to growth [see in particular Knack, Keefer (1997),
who show empirically that trust and norms of civic cooperation are more
relevant for growth than associational activities]. Here we add that, even
if this negative eﬀect were compensated (to some extent) through defensive
strategies and substitution channels which foster private growth, the overall
eﬀect in terms of well-being might still be negative20. Hence, the ﬁrst (easy)
conclusion is that private growth is not a suﬃcient target for policy, but its
social consequences should be taken into account as well. To go beyond this
vague statement, it is opportune to distinguish [see Collier (1998)] between
social capital provided by government and social capital provided by civil
society. Indeed, policy conclusions are easier to understand for the former
than for the latter, whereas the present paper is more concerned with the
latter, i.e. with social capital arising from spontaneous social participation.
Nevertheless, there may be the scope for some intervention in this ﬁeld as
well, as the government could act, through an adequate system of rights, laws,
incentives and services, as the engine that allows individuals to overcome the
coordination failure problem pointed out above. This means that government
and civil society may be seen as complementary in generating the conditions
for social capital accumulation. On the other hand, if either of them does
not work properly, the other one may play, to a certain extent, a substitutive
role [see Narayan (1999) for a deeper analysis of virtuous and vicious paths in
the interaction between state and civil society], but this kind of substitution
is unlikely to drive to social and economic prosperity. Examples of possible
interventions, frequent in the literature, are promotion of association rights,
improvement of communication systems and infrastructures and facilitating
20This is especially relevant if measures of growth just take into consideration production
and consumption of private goods.
20’cross-cutting ties’ among diﬀerent social groups. What seems not possible
for the state to do, according to Paldam, Svendsen (2000), is to enforce social
capital top-down, since the latter emerges essentially out of a self-enforcing
process, that can be incentivated, but not substituted for [see also Rose
(1998) for insights in the case of Russia]. A deeper analysis of these policy
implications is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Concluding remarks
We developed an evolutionary model of growth in which agents choose how
to allocate their time between private and social activities. Participating to
the latter ones requires time and forgoing some private consumption, but
they provide an individual utility which depends both on her own and on ag-
gregate participation, as well as on the opportunities available in the social
environment. Agents may defend themselves from a poor social environment
by shifting to private activities, less exposed to external eﬀects. If this strat-
egy spreads over, private activities will be fostered, but at the expense of
social activities. Since both eﬀects accumulate over time, the outcome may
be a joint occurrence of economic growth and social poverty. On one side,
this is likely to increase social costs (from crime prevention to children and
elder keeping [see Coleman (1990)], from schooling in most diseased areas
[see Benabou (1993)] to monitoring and transaction costs for ﬁrms, to the
lost of real opportunities provided by social links [see Granovetter (1973)]);
on the other side (and most importantly, since higher private growth could
in principle allow an economy to face higher social costs), economic growth
needs not be optimal in terms of well-being. A possible alternative outcome
is that of a large amount of time spent in social activities, which brings about
a rich social environment (i.e. growth in the social opportunities available to
the individuals), but may act as an obstacle to private growth. When both
these outcomes are possible, the present framework shows that the latter is
Pareto-superior to the former one (a plausible result in advanced societies).
Our analysis has introduced a certain number of innovative features,
which call for a deeper investigation in future. The present model may be ex-
tended ﬁrst of all by allowing for the possibility of a balanced growth between
private and social activities. Two eﬀects might be relevant from this point
of view. On one side, social capital increases productivity in the private sec-
tor, as well established in the quoted literature, and this renders even more
21serious the problems created by under-investment in social activities (social
poverty traps), while, at the same time, it allows a balanced growth when so-
cial participation is high enough. On the other side, market activities might
themselves contribute to create new relations, thus rendering less serious the
problem of social poverty and, in turn, allowing a balanced growth even with
a low social participation. Since the two eﬀects are counterbalancing, our
basic results should still hold under these extensions.
A second extension of the model would be to consider contexts in which,
on one side, physical and human capital accumulation may be taken into
account, and, on the other side, social capital accumulation may be more
deeply investigated by regarding it as a socially diﬀerentiated process. It
will also be interesting to compare the present results with the ones that
can be obtained outside an evolutionary context, e.g. in an inﬁnite-life agent
model or in an OLG context. The analysis in terms of well-being may be
extended as well, since social evolution not only determines how actual needs
are satisﬁed, but it directly inﬂuences the formation of such needs too (an
aspect that is particularly diﬃcult to capture, and that can be legitimately
ignored in a short run or even in a medium run horizon, but that appears
crucially relevant for any long term analysis of well-being).
Finally, as the concepts of relational goods and of social capital are still
unusual in the most known economic literature, it may be worth to conclude
with a brief consideration about their methodological status. In particular,
they ﬁt well Granovetter’s (1985) program of considering together individual
actions and social structures, and are well compatible with an extended form
of methodological individualism, in which individuals are still the starting
point, but they are no more seen as atoms isolated from one another [see
Donzelli (1986) and Boland (1982)]. Moreover, the investigation of the rela-
tional dimension of individual choices is likely to lead us to extend the scope
of economic analysis to consider how cultural and social factors inﬂuence
needs and purposes of people. Of course, any strict disciple of Robbins’s
(1935) epistemology would reply that economics deals with the allocation of
scarce means to given alternative purposes and does not discuss the sense of
these goals. In contrast, our opinion is that, as well-being and growth may
depend to a relevant degree upon the speciﬁc motivational structure belong-
ing to agents within a certain culture, it might be worth for economists to
directly tackle their determination and evolution [for examples of analyses
of this kind see Joireman et al. (1996), Menicucci and Sacco (1996), Sacco
(1997), Sacco and Zamagni (1997)]. Indeed, this question develops somehow
22the same core as methodological individualism (since its starting point is
made of intentional choices), but it brings beyond it, because it recognizes
that purposes themselves are not a primum of the analysis, as it is well ac-
knowledged in other social sciences [see e.g. the category of sense, which is
always presupposed by that of purpose, in the analyses of Heidegger (1927)
for philosophy, of Habermas (1981) for sociology and of Greimas (1983) for
semiotics].
Appendix: classiﬁcation of dynamics (??), (??)
For simplicity, in the following classiﬁcation we shall consider ’robust’ cases only,
i.e. those which do not correspond to equality conditions on parameters’ values
(except for γ = 1).
Let us ﬁrst consider the locus ˙ Ks = 0. To this end, notice that ˙ Ks = 0 holds
if Ks = 0 or if:
[sL + (sH − sL)x]1+βKγ−1
s = δ. (17)
For γ = 1, equation (??) is satisﬁed if and only if






holds; in this context, ˙ Ks < 0 if and only if x < x∗ and ˙ Ks > 0 if and only if
x > x∗.
For γ 6= 1, equation (??) deﬁnes a function
Ks = ˆ Ks(x) ≡

δ
[sL + (sH − sL)x]1+β
γ−1
, (19)
which is strictly increasing in x if γ < 1 and strictly decreasing if γ > 1. In



















21Notice that limsL→0 ˆ Ks(0) = +∞ if γ > 1 and limsL→0 ˆ Ks(0) = 0 if γ < 1.
23If γ < 1, below (above) the graph of ˆ Ks(x) it holds ˙ Ks > 0 (respectively,
˙ Ks < 0), while the opposite holds if γ > 1.
Let us now consider the locus ˙ x = 0. As discussed in Section 5, ˙ x = 0 ⇐⇒
{x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ ∆U(Ks,x) = 0} and ∆U(Ks,x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = ¯ x [see equation
(??)], but now, being Ks no more a ﬁxed parameter, (??) deﬁnes a function
Ks = ˜ Ks(x) ≡
(
a¯ Ys




strictly decreasing in x with ˜ Ks(1) = K1
s (see Proposition 1) and ˜ Ks(0) = K2
s.
Below (above) the graph of ˜ Ks(x) it holds ˙ x < 0 (respectively, ˙ x > 0).
Notice that the points (Ks,x) = (0,0) and (Ks,x) = (0,1) are always ﬁxed
points under dynamics (??), (??). The points (Ks,x) = ( ˆ Ks(0),0) and (Ks,x) =
( ˆ Ks(1),1) are ﬁxed points for γ 6= 1. In each of these ﬁxed points, there is no
coexistence of the two strategies. The existence of an ’interior’ ﬁxed point (i.e. a
ﬁxed point where Ks > 0 and 0 < x < 1) depends on the shape of the graphs of
˜ Ks(x) and ˆ Ks(x). It is easy to check that, if the graphs of ˜ Ks(x) and ˆ Ks(x) cross




dx . Therefore, there
exists at most an interior ﬁxed point and, when existing, it is always an hyperbolic
saddle22.
Let us classify dynamics (??), (??).
Case (a): γ > 1
There are three subcases:
(a.1) For ˆ Ks(1) > ˜ Ks(1), the interior saddle does not exist, (0,1) and ( ˆ Ks(1),1)
are saddles23, (0,0) is a sink (i.e. it is locally attractive) and ( ˆ Ks(0),0) is a
source (i.e. it is repulsive). The stable manifold of ( ˆ Ks(1),1) separates the
trajectories that approach (0,0) from those where Ks goes to inﬁnity and x
approaches 1 (see ﬁgure 2.a).
(a.2) For ˆ Ks(1) < ˜ Ks(1) and ˆ Ks(0) > ˜ Ks(0), there exists an interior saddle, (0,0)





dx implies that the determinant of the jacobian matrix
evaluated at the interior ﬁxed point is strictly negative; consequently, the associated eigen-
values are both diﬀerent from zero (i.e. the ﬁxed point is hyperbolic) and have opposite
sign (i.e. the ﬁxed point is a saddle point).
23The stability properties of the ﬁxed points on the edges of the state space follow from
a straightforward application of linearization techniques.
24The stable manifold of the interior saddle separates the two dynamic regimes
described in case (a.1) (see ﬁgure 2.b).
(a.3) For ˆ Ks(0) > ˜ Ks(0), the interior saddle does not exist, (0,0) is a sink, both
(0,1) and ( ˆ Ks(0),0) are saddles, and ( ˆ Ks(1),1) is a source. The stable
manifold of ( ˆ Ks(0),0) separates the two dynamic regimes described in case
(a.1). (see ﬁgure 2.c).
Case (b): γ = 1
There are three subcases:
(b.1) For x∗ > 1 [see (??)], the interior saddle does not exist, (0,0) is a saddle
and (0,1) is a source. Along almost every trajectory x approaches the value
1 and Ks goes to inﬁnity (see ﬁgure 3a).
(b.2) For 0 < x∗ < 1, there exists the interior saddle, (0,0) is a sink and (0,1)
is a source. The stable manifold of the interior saddle separates the two
dynamic regimes described in (a.1) (see ﬁgure 3b).
(b.3) For x∗ < 0, the interior saddle does not exist, (0,0) is a sink and (0,1) is a
saddle. Almost all trajectories x approach (0,0) (see ﬁgure 3c).
Case (c): γ < 1
There are three subcases:
(c.1) For ˆ Ks(0) > ˜ Ks(0), the interior saddle does not exist, both (0,0) and
( ˆ Ks(0),0) are saddles, (0,1) is a source and ( ˆ Ks(1),1) is a sink. Almost
all the trajectories approach the sink (see ﬁgure 4.a).
(c.2) For ˆ Ks(0) < ˜ Ks(0) and ˆ Ks(1) > ˜ Ks(0), there exists the interior saddle,
(0,0) is a saddle, (0,1) is a source, both ( ˆ Ks(0),0) and ( ˆ Ks(1),1) are sinks.
The stable manifold of the interior saddle separates the attraction basins of
the two sinks (see ﬁgure 4.b).
(c.3) For ˆ Ks(1) < ˜ Ks(1), the interior saddle does not exist, both (0,0) and
( ˆ Ks(1),1) are saddles, (0,1) is a source and ( ˆ Ks(0),0) is a sink. Almost
all the trajectories approach the sink (see ﬁgure 4.c).
25References
[1] Aghion P., Howitt P. (1998), Endogenous Growth Theory, Cambridge, Mass.,
The MIT Press
[2] Akerlof G., Kranton R. (2000), Economics and Identity, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. CXV, N. 3, 715-753
[3] Anderson E. (1990), The Ethical Limitations of the Market, Economics and
Philosophy, n.6
[4] Antoci A., Bartolini S. (1999), Negative Externalities as the Engine of Growth
in an Evolutionary Context, Mimeo, University of Florence
[5] Barro R., Sala-i-Martin X. (1995), Economic Growth, New York (etc.),
McGraw-Hill
[6] Becker G. (1965), A Theory of the Allocation of Time, Economic Journal,
September, 508
[7] Benabou (1993), Workings of a City: Location, Education and Production,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 619-652
[8] Bj¨ ornerstedt J., Weibull J. (1996), Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Im-
itation, in K. Arrow et al. (eds.), The Rational Foundations of Economic
Behaviour, London: Macmillan, 155-171
[9] Boland L. (1982), The Foundations of Economic Method, Allen & Unwin
[10] B¨ orgers T., Sarin R. (1997), Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator
Dynamics, Journal of Economic Theory 77, 1-14
[11] Bowles S., Gintis H. (2000), Social Capital and Community Governance,
Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Mussuchussetts, submitted
to the Economic Journal
[12] Cole H.L., Mailath G.J., Postlewaite A. (1992), Social Norms, Saving Behav-
ior and Growth, Journal of Political Economy, 100, 1092-1125
[13] Coleman J. (1990), Social Capital, in J. Coleman, Foundations of Social The-
ory, Cambridge, Mass., and London, England, The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press
[14] Coleman J. (1988), Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology, 94S, S95-S120
26[15] Collier P. (1998), Social Capital and Poverty, Social Capital Initiative Work-
ing Paper n.4, The World Bank
[16] Corneo G., Jeanne O. (1999a), Social Organization in an Endogenous Growth
Model, International Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, 711-725
[17] Corneo G., Jeanne O. (1999b), Pecuniary Emulation, Inequality and Growth,
European Economic Review, 43, 1665-1678
[18] Donzelli F. (1986), Il concetto di equilibrio nella teoria economica neoclassica,
Roma, La Nuova Italia Scientiﬁca
[19] Elster J. (1989), The Cement of Society. A Study of Social Order, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press
[20] Fukuyama F. (1995), Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity,
London, Penguin
[21] Glaeser E.L., Laibson D., Scheinkman J.A., Soutter C.L. (1999), What is So-
cial Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness, NBER Work-
ing Paper 7216
[22] Granovetter M. (1973), The Strength of Weak Ties, American Journal of
Sociology, n.78
[23] Granovetter M. (1985), Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology, vol.91 n.3
[24] Greimas A.J. (1983), Du Sens II. Essais S´ emiotique, Paris, ´ Editions du Seuil
[25] Grootaert C. (1998), Social Capital: The Missing Link?, Social Capital Ini-
tiative Working Paper N.3, The World Bank
[26] Gui B. (2000), ed., Economics and Interpersonal Relations, Annals of Public
and Cooperative Economics, 71:2
[27] Habermas J. (1981), Theorie des kommunikativen Handels, Frankfurt am
Main, Suhrkamp
[28] Heidegger M. (1927), Sein und Zeit, T¨ ubingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag
[29] Hirsch F. (1976), Social Limits to Growth, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Uni-
versity Press
27[30] Joireman J.A., Shalley G.P., Teta P.D., Wilding J., Kuhlman D.M. (1996),
Computer Simulation of Social Value Orientation: Vitality, Satisfaction, and
Emergent Game Structures, in Liebrand W.B.G., Messick D.M. (eds.), Fron-
tiers in Social Dilemmas Research, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer Verlag
[31] Knack S., Keefer P. (1997), Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoﬀ?
A Cross-Country Investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII, 1251-
1288
[32] Lucas R. (1988), On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol.22(1), 3-42
[33] Menicucci D., Sacco P.L. (1996), Evolutionary Dynamics with λ-players:
Enforcing Social Outcomes Via Selective Adaptation of Individual Pseudo-
motivations, Mimeo, University of Florence
[34] Moscovici (1993), The Invention of Society: Psychological Explanations for
Social Phenomena, Cambridge, MA, USA, Polity Press
[35] Narayan D. (1999), Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty, Poverty
Group, PREM, The World Bank
[36] Nussbaum M. (1986), The Fragility of Goodnes: Luck and Ethics in Greek
Tragedy and Philosophy (chapter 12, The Vulnerability of the Good Life:
Relational Goods), Cambridge (etc.), Cambridge University Press
[37] Paldam M., Svendsen G.T. (2000), An Essay on Social Capital: Looking
for the Fire Behind the Smoke, European Journal of Political Economy, 16,
339-366
[38] Polanyi K. (1977), The Livelihood of Man, New York, Academic Press
[39] Putnam R. (1993), The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public
Life, The American Prospect, 13, 35-42
[40] Putnam R. (1995), Bowling Alone: America’s Declinig Social Capital, Journal
of Democracy, 6(1), 65-78
[41] Robbins L. (1935), An Essay on the Nature and Signiﬁcance of Economic
Science, London, Macmillan (second edition)
[42] Romer P.M. (1989), Capital Accumulation in the Theory of Long Run
Growth, in Barro R.J. (ed.), Modern Business Cycle Theory
28[43] Rose R. (1998) Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society: Social Cap-
ital Networks in Russia, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper N.6, The
World Bank
[44] Sacco (1997), On the Dynamics of Social Norms, in Bicchieri C., Jeﬀrey R.,
Skyrms B. (eds), The Dynamics of Norms, Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge
University Press
[45] Sacco P.L., Zamagni S. (1997), Civil Economy, Cultural Evolution and Partic-
ipatory Development: A Theoretical Enquiry, Mimeo, University of Bologna
[46] Schiﬀ M. (1992), Social Capital, Labor Mobility, and Welfare, Rationality and
Society 4, 157-175
[47] Schiﬀ M. (1999), Labor Market Integratin in the Presence of Social Capital,
Development Research Group, World Bank
[48] Schlag K. (1998), Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Boundedly Rational Ap-
proach to Multi-Armed Bandits, Journal of Economic Theory 78(1), 130-156
[49] Temple J., Johnson P. (1998), Social Capability and Economic Growth, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, August, 965-990
[50] Uhlaner C.J. (1989), Relational Goods and Participation: Incorporating So-
ciability into a Theory of Rational Action, Public Choice n.62
[51] Weibull (1995), Evolutionary Game Theory, Cambridge, MIT Press
[52] World Bank (2001), Social Capital Library,
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/library/index.htm
29